Does Stabilizing Inflation Contribute To Stabilizing Economic Activity? by Frederic S. Mishkin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









Based on a speech at East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, February 25, 2008.  I would
like to thank Michael Kiley and Thomas Laubach for assistance and helpful comments.  The views
expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Frederic S. Mishkin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Does Stabilizing Inflation Contribute To Stabilizing Economic Activity?
Frederic S. Mishkin




This paper discusses recent economic research that demonstrates that the objectives of price stability
and stabilizing economic activity are often likely to be mutually reinforcing.  Thus, the answer to the








  The ultimate purpose of a central bank should be to promote the public good 
through policies that foster economic prosperity.  Research in monetary economics 
describes this purpose by specifying monetary policy objectives in terms of stabilizing 
both inflation and economic activity.  Indeed, this specification of monetary policy 
objectives is exactly what is suggested by the dual mandate that the Congress has given 
to the Federal Reserve to promote both price stability and maximum employment.
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  We might worry that, under some circumstances, the objectives of stabilizing 
inflation and economic activity could conflict, particularly in the short run.  However, 
economic research over the past three decades suggests that such conflicts may not, in 
fact, be that serious.  Indeed, stabilizing inflation and stabilizing economic activity are 
mutually reinforcing not only in the long run, but in the short run as well.  In this paper, I 
would like to outline how economic researchers came to that conclusion, and in so doing, 
explain why it is so important to achieve and maintain price stability. 
 
The Long Run 
  Both economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that the stabilization of 
inflation promotes stronger economic activity in the long run.
2  Two principles underlie 
that conclusion.  The first principle is that low inflation is beneficial for economic 
welfare.  Rates of inflation significantly above the low levels of recent years can have 
serious adverse effects on economic efficiency and hence on output in the long run.  The 
                                                 
1 The Federal Reserve’s congressional mandate is actually couched in terms of the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.  However, as I have discussed in Mishkin 
(2007a), the mandate is more appropriately interpreted in terms of the dual goals of price stability and 
maximum sustainable employment, and this formulation is what is consistent with stabilizing both inflation 
and economic activity. 
2 Mishkin (2007c) outlines a set of principles that form the basis of the science of monetary policy that is 
currently practiced.   2
distortions from a moderate to high level of long-run inflation are many.  High inflation 
can cause confusion among households and firms, thereby distorting savings and 
investment decisions (Lucas, 1972; Briault, 1995; Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997).  
The interaction of inflation and the tax code, which is often applied to nominal income, 
can have adverse effects, especially on the incentive of firms to invest in productive 
capital (Feldstein, 1997).  Infrequent nominal price adjustment implies that high inflation 
results in distorted relative prices, thereby leading to an inefficient allocation of resources 
(Woodford, 2003).  And high inflation distorts the financial sector as firms and 
households demand greater protection from inflation’s erosion of the value of cash 
holdings (English, 1999). 
  The second principle is the lack of a long-run tradeoff between unemployment 
and the inflation rate.  Rather, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, implying that the 
economy gravitates to some natural rate of unemployment in the long run no matter what 
the rate of inflation is (Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1968).
 3  The natural rate, in turn, is 
determined by the structure of labor and product markets, including elements such as the 
ease with which people who lose their jobs can find new employment and the pace at 
which technological progress creates new industries and occupations while shrinking or 
eliminating others.  Importantly, those structural features of the economy are outside the 
control of monetary policy.  As a result, any attempt by a central bank to keep 
unemployment below the natural rate would prove fruitless.  Such a strategy would only 
                                                 
3 The deleterious effects of inflation on economic efficiency imply that the level of sustainable employment 
may even be higher at lower rates of inflation.  Thus, the goals of price stability and high employment are 
likely to be complementary, rather than competing, and so there is no policy tradeoff between the goals of 
price stability and maximum sustainable employment.  A further possibility is that low inflation may even 
help increase the rate of economic growth.  Although time-series studies of individual countries and cross-
national comparisons of growth rates are not in total agreement (Anderson and Gruen, 1995), the consensus 
has developed that inflation is detrimental to economic growth, particularly when inflation rates are high.   3
lead to higher inflation that, as the first principle suggests, would lower economic activity 
and household welfare in the long run. 
  Empirical evidence has starkly demonstrated the adverse effects of high inflation 
(e.g., see the surveys in Fischer, 1993, and Anderson and Gruen, 1995).  In most 
industrialized countries, the late 1960s to early 1980s was a period during which inflation 
rose to high levels while economic activity stagnated.  While many factors contributed to 
the improved economic performance of recent decades, policymakers’ focus on low and 
stable inflation was likely an important factor.
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The Short Run 
  Although there is no long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, in 
the short run, expansionary monetary policy that raises inflation can lower 
unemployment and raise employment.  That is, the short-run Phillips curve is not vertical.  
That fact would seem to suggest that achieving the dual goals of price stability and 
maximum sustainable employment might at times conflict.  However, several lines of 
research provide support for the view that stabilization of inflation and economic activity 
can be complementary rather than in conflict.   
  Economists have long recognized that some sources of economic fluctuations 
imply that output stability and inflation stability are mutually reinforcing.  Consider a 
negative shock to aggregate demand (such as a decline in consumer confidence) that 
causes households to cut spending.  The drop in demand leads, in turn, to a decline in 
                                                 
4 Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and Kiley (2007a) provide evidence that 
monetary policy that stabilized inflation played an important role in stabilizing real activity.  However, 
Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) argue that “good luck” from a reduction in the volatility of 
shocks was more important in stabilizing output.   4
actual output relative to its potential—that is, the level of output that the economy can 
produce at the maximum sustainable level of employment.  As a result of increased slack 
in the economy, future inflation will fall below levels consistent with price stability, and 
the central bank will pursue an expansionary policy to keep inflation from falling.  The 
expansionary policy will then result in an increase in demand that boosts output toward 
its potential to return inflation to a level consistent with price stability.  Stabilizing output 
thus stabilizes inflation and vice versa under these conditions. 
For example, the Federal Reserve reduced its target for the federal funds rate a 
total of 5-1/2 percentage points during the 2001 recession; that stimulus not only 
contributed to economic recovery but also helped to avoid an unwelcome decline in 
inflation below its already low level.  At other times, a tightening of the stance of 
monetary policy has prevented the economy from overheating and generating a boom-
bust cycle in the level of employment as well as an undesirable upward spurt of inflation. 
One critical precondition for effective central-bank easing in response to adverse 
demand shocks is anchored long-run inflation expectations.  Otherwise, lowering short-
term interest rates could raise inflation expectations, which might lead to higher, rather 
than lower, long-term interest rates, thereby depriving monetary policy of one of its key 
transmission channels for stimulating the economy.  The role of expectations illustrates 
two additional basic principles of monetary policy that help explain why stabilizing 
inflation helps stabilize economic activity:  First, expectations of future policy actions 
and accompanying economic conditions play a crucial role in determining the effects of 
current policy actions on the economy.  Second, monetary policy is most effective when 
the central bank is firmly committed, through its actions and statements, to a “nominal   5
anchor”—such as to keeping inflation low and stable.  A strong commitment to 
stabilizing inflation helps anchor inflation expectations so that a central bank will not 
have to worry that expansionary policy to counter a negative demand shock will lead to a 
sharp rise in expected inflation—a so-called inflation scare (Goodfriend, 1993, 2005). 
Such a scare would not only blunt the effects of lower short-term interest rates on real 
activity but would also push up actual inflation in the future.  Thus, a strong commitment 
to a nominal anchor enables a central bank to react more aggressively to negative demand 
shocks and, therefore, to prevent rapid declines in employment or output. 
Unlike demand shocks, which drive inflation and economic activity in the same 
direction and thus present policymakers with a clear signal for how to adjust policy, 
supply shocks, such as the increases in the price of energy that we have been 
experiencing lately, drive inflation and output in opposite directions.  In this case, 
because tightening monetary policy to reduce inflation can lead to lower output, the goal 
of stabilizing inflation might conflict with the goal of stabilizing economic activity.  
Here again, a strong, previously established commitment to stabilizing inflation 
can help stabilize economic activity, because supply shocks, such as a rise in relative 
energy prices, are likely to have only a temporary effect on inflation in such 
circumstances.  When inflation expectations are well anchored, the central bank does not 
necessarily need to raise interest rates aggressively to keep inflation under control 
following an aggregate supply shock. Hence, the commitment to price stability can help 
avoid imposing unnecessary hardship on workers and the economy more broadly. 
  The experience of recent decades supports the view that a substantial conflict 
between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output in response to supply shocks does not   6
arise if inflation expectations are well anchored.  The oil shocks in the 1970s caused large 
increases in inflation not only through their direct effects on household energy prices but 
also through their “second round” effects on the prices of other goods that reflected, in 
part, expectations of higher future inflation.  Sharp economic downturns followed, driven 
partly by restrictive monetary policy actions taken in response to the inflation outbreaks.  
In contrast, the run-up in energy prices since 2003 has had only modest effects on 
inflation for other goods; as a result, monetary policy has been able to avoid responding 
precipitously to higher oil prices.  More generally, the period from the mid-1960s to the 
early 1980s was one of relatively high and volatile inflation; at the same time, real 
activity was very volatile.  Since the early 1980s, central banks have put greater weight 
on achieving low and stable inflation, while during the same period, real activity 
stabilized appreciably.  Many factors were likely at work, but this experience suggests 
that inflation stabilization does not have to come at the cost of greater volatility of real 
activity; in fact, it suggests that, by anchoring inflation expectations, low and stable 
inflation is an important precondition for macroeconomic stability. 
Research over the past decade using so-called New Keynesian models has added 
further support to the proposition that inflation stabilization may contribute to stabilizing 
employment and output at their maximum sustainable levels.  This research has also led 
to a deeper understanding of the benefits of price stability and the setting of monetary 
policy in response to changes in economic activity and inflation. 
In particular, research has emphasized the interaction between stabilizing inflation 
and economic activity and has found that price stability can contribute to overall 
economic stability in a range of circumstances.  The intuition that leads to the conclusion   7
that stabilizing inflation promotes maximum sustainable output and employment is 
simple, and it holds in a range of economic models whose policy prescriptions have been 
dubbed the New Neoclassical Synthesis.  To begin, the prices of many goods and services 
adjust infrequently.  Accordingly, under general price inflation, the prices of some goods 
and services are changing while other prices do not, thus distorting relative prices 
between different goods and services.  As a consequence, the profitability of producing 
the various goods and services no longer reflects the relative social costs of producing 
them, which in turn yields an inefficient allocation of resources.  A policy of price 
stability minimizes those inefficiencies (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1997; Woodford, 2003).   
There are several subtleties here.  First, in some circumstance, relative prices 
should change.  For example, the rapid technological advances in the production of 
information-technology goods witnessed over the past decades mean that the prices of 
these goods relative to other goods and services should decline, because fewer economic 
resources are required for their production.  Conversely, shifts in the balance between 
global demand for, and supply of, oil require that relative prices change to achieve an 
appropriate reallocation of resources—in this case, the reduced use of expensive energy.  
Thus, the policy prescription from the New Neoclassical synthesis refers to stability of 
the price level as a whole, not to the stability of each individual price. 
Second, the New Neoclassical Synthesis suggests that only those prices that move 
sluggishly, referred to as sticky prices, should be stabilized.  Indeed, these models 
indicate that monetary policy should try to get the economy to operate at the same level 
that would prevail if all prices were flexible—that is, at the so-called natural rate of   8
output or employment.  Stabilizing sticky prices helps the economy get close to the 
theoretical flexible-price equilibrium because it keeps sticky prices from moving away 
from their appropriate relative level while flexible prices are adjusting to their own 
appropriate relative level.  The New Neoclassical Synthesis, therefore, does not suggest 
that headline inflation, in which the weight on flexible prices is larger, should be 
stabilized.  For example, to the extent that households directly consume energy goods 
with flexible prices, such as gasoline, headline inflation should be allowed to increase in 
response to an oil price shock.  At the same time, insofar as energy enters as an input in 
the production of goods whose prices are sticky, stabilizing the level of sticky prices 
would require that the increase in energy-intensive goods prices be offset by declines in 
the prices of other goods.   
That reasoning suggests that better outcomes in terms of stabilizing output and 
employment would come from monetary policy which focuses on stabilizing a measure 
of “core” inflation, which is made up mostly of sticky prices.  Simulations with FRB/US, 
the model of the U.S. economy created and maintained by the staff of the Federal 
Reserve Board (Mishkin, 2007b), illustrate this point.  To keep the simulations as simple 
as possible, I have assumed that the economy begins at full employment with both 
headline and core inflation at desired levels.  The economy is then assumed to experience 
a shock that raises the world price of oil about $30 per barrel over two years; the shock is 
assumed to slowly dissipate thereafter.  In each of two scenarios, a Taylor rule is assumed 
to govern the response of the federal funds rate; the only difference between the two 
scenarios is that in one, the federal funds rate responds to core personal consumption   9
expenditures (PCE) inflation, whereas in the other, it responds to headline PCE inflation.
5  
Figure 1 illustrates the results of those two scenarios.  The federal funds rate jumps 
higher and faster when the central bank responds to headline inflation rather than to core 
inflation, as would be expected (top-left panel).  Likewise, responding to headline 
inflation pushes the unemployment rate markedly higher than otherwise in the early 
going (top-right panel), and produces an inflation rate that is slightly lower than 
otherwise, whether measured by core or headline indexes (bottom panels).  More 
important, even for a shock as persistent as this one, the policy response under headline 
inflation has to be unwound in the sense that the federal funds rate must drop 
substantially below baseline once the first-round effects of the shock drop out of the 
inflation data.
6  
The basic point from these simulations is that monetary policy that responds to 
headline inflation rather than to core inflation in response to an oil price shock pushes 
unemployment markedly higher than monetary policy that responds to core inflation.  In 
addition, because this policy has larger swings in the federal funds rate that must be 
reversed, it leads to more pronounced swings in unemployment.  On the other hand, 
monetary policy that responds to core inflation does not lead to appreciably worse 
performance on stabilizing inflation than does monetary policy that responds to headline 
                                                 
5 The Taylor rule is written as follows: 
** () Rr y ππ π = ++ − + %% , where R is the nominal policy rate; r* is 
the equilibrium real short-term rate; π %  is the four-quarter inflation rate, either core or headline; 
* π is the 
inflation target, taken to be the baseline inflation rate; and  y is the output gap. Under that specification, the 
response coefficient on each gap variable is 1. 
6 The scenarios were constructed with a rule that assumes no knowledge of how long the oil price shock 
will last.  Research done by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board using other types of models also 
suggests that when the persistence of shocks is uncertain, the use of core inflation rather than headline 
inflation  in central-bank reaction functions can improve policy outcomes (Bodenstein, Erceg, and 
Guerrieri, 2007).   10
inflation.  Stabilizing core inflation, therefore, leads to better economic outcomes than 
stabilizing headline inflation.   
Although the simplest sticky-price models imply that stabilizing sticky-price 
inflation and economic activity are two sides of the same coin, the presence of other 
frictions besides sticky prices can lead to instances in which completely stabilizing 
sticky-price inflation would not imply stabilizing employment (or output) around their 
natural rates.  For example, in response to an increase in productivity (a positive 
technology shock), the real wage has to rise to reflect the higher marginal product of 
labor inputs, which requires either prices to fall or nominal wages to rise for employment 
to reach its natural rate.  If both nominal wages and prices are sticky, a policy of 
completely stabilizing prices will force the necessary real wage adjustment to occur 
entirely through nominal wage adjustment, thereby impeding the adjustment of 
employment to its efficient level (Blanchard, 1997; Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000).  
Indeed, if wages are much stickier than prices, the best strategy to promote stable output 
and employment is to stabilize nominal wage inflation rather than price inflation, thereby 
allowing price inflation to decline to achieve the required increase in real wages. 
  Fluctuations in inflation and economic activity induced by variation over time in 
sources of economic inefficiency, such as changes in the markups in goods and labor 
markets or inefficiencies in labor market search, could also drive a wedge between the 
goals of stabilizing inflation and economic activity (Blanchard and Galí, 2006; Galí, 
Gertler, and López-Salido, 2007).  For example, in sectors of the economy subject to little 
competitive pressure, prices that firms set tend to be higher and output lower than would 
prevail under greater competition.  Monetary policy is, of course, unable to offset   11
permanently high markups because of the principle, mentioned earlier, that the long-run 
Phillips curve is vertical.  However, a temporary increase in monopoly power that raises 
markups would exert upward pressure on prices without, at the same time, reducing the 
productive potential of the economy.  That would, indeed, be a case of a tradeoff between 
stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output. 
  These examples narrow the degree to which the recent findings apply in all cases 
of congruence between stabilizing inflation and economic activity (sometimes referred to 
as the “divine coincidence”, Blanchard, 2005), but they do not necessarily overturn the 
findings.  The example of sticky wages would not invalidate the view that stabilizing 
inflation stabilizes economic activity if wages are sticky, for example, because they are 
held constant in order to operate as an “insurance” contract between employers and 
workers (Goodfriend and King, 2001).  And for many of the inefficient shocks that drive 
a wedge between the sustainable level of output and the level of output associated with 
price stability, monetary policy may be the wrong tool to offset their effects (Blanchard, 
2005). 
Of course, central banks at times will still face difficult decisions regarding the 
short-run tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and output.  For example, judging from 
the fit of New Keynesian Phillips curves, a substantial fraction of overall inflation 
variability seems related to supply-type shocks that create a tradeoff between inflation 
and output-gap stabilization (Kiley, 2007b).  But the key insight from recent research—
that the interaction between inflation fluctuations and relative price distortions should 
lead to a focus on the stability of nominal prices that adjust sluggishly—will likely prove   12
to have important practical implications that can help contribute to inflation and 
employment stabilization.  
 
Stabilizing Inflation as a Robust Policy in the Presence of Uncertainty 
The discussion so far has been based on the premise that the central bank knows 
the efficient, or natural, rate of output or employment.  However, the natural rates of 
employment and output cannot be directly observed and are subject to considerable 
uncertainty—particularly in real time.  Indeed, economists do not even agree on the 
economic theory or econometric methods that should be used to measure those rates.  
These concerns are perhaps even more severe in the most recent models, where 
fluctuations in natural rates of output or employment can be very substantial (for 
example, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, forthcoming).  
Furthermore, because the natural rates in the most recent models are defined as the 
counterfactual levels of output and employment that would be obtained if prices and 
wages were completely flexible, the estimated fluctuations in natural rates generated by 
the research are very sensitive to model specification. 
 If a central bank errs in measuring the natural rates of output and employment, its 
attempts to stabilize economic activity at those mismeasured natural rates can lead to 
very poor outcomes.  For example, most economists now agree that the natural 
unemployment rate shifted up for many years starting in the late 1960s and that the 
growth of potential output shifted down for a considerable time after 1970.  However, 
perhaps because those shifts were not generally recognized until much later (Orphanides 
and van Norden, 2002; Orphanides, 2003), monetary policy in the 1970s seems to have   13
been aimed at achieving unsustainable levels of output and employment.  Hence, 
policymakers may have unwittingly contributed to accelerating inflation that reached 
double digits by the end of the decade as well as undesirable swings in unemployment.  
And although subsequent monetary policy tightening was successful in regaining control 
of inflation, the toll was a severe recession in 1981-82, which pushed up the 
unemployment rate to around 10 percent.   
Uncertainty about the natural rates of economic activity implies that less weight 
may need to be put on stabilizing output or employment around what is likely to be a 
mismeasured natural rate (Orphanides and Williams, 2002).  Furthermore, research with 
New Keynesian models has found that overall economic performance may be most 
efficiently achieved by policies with a heavy focus on stabilizing inflation (for example, 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
  Because monetary policy has not one but two objectives, stabilizing inflation and 
stabilizing economic activity, it might seem obvious that those objectives would usually, 
if not always, conflict.  As so often occurs with the “obvious,” however, the impression 
turns out to be incorrect.  The economic research that I have discussed today 
demonstrates, rather, that the objectives of price stability and stabilizing economic 
activity are often likely to be mutually reinforcing.  Thus, the answer to the title of this 
paper—“Does stabilizing inflation contribute to stabilizing economic activity?”—is, for 
the most part, yes.   14
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Implications of Responding to Core versus Headline PCE Inflation
(Persistent oil price shock with the FRB/US Model, levels relative to baseline)
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Note: Headline PCE inflation is the change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE).
Core PCE inflation is the change in the price index for PCE excluding food and energy.  